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Abstract
Memorability vis-a`-vis password strength and
reuse [46, 47, 31, 44, 13] is one of the major issues
of the prevalent authentication method. The situa-
tion is aggravated by security fatigue [14, 35].
We investigate how users’ password memora-
bility differ over password reuse and strength as
well as across cognitively depleted and undepleted
groups.
Non-computer science students (N = 100) were
randomly assigned to two groups, asked to gener-
ate a password and to return to the lab a week later
to login. One group was cognitively depleted, the
other was not. Password reuse and strength were
observed. Password memorability was measured
and compared across depletion groups, reuse and
strength.
Agreeable users are more likely to create a new
password (OR = 5). Men were four times as likely
to create a new password compared to women.
Users who have reused an existing password are
more than 100 times as likely to recall their pass-
word compared to users who created a new one.
Users who have been cognitively depleted at the
time of registration are less likely to recall their
password (OR = 0.032). However, surprisingly,
the likelihood to recall the password was neither
significantly impacted by last time of use OR =
0.999 [0.995,1.002] nor by the password strength
OR = 0.981 [0.737,1.303].
This is the first study to establish empirically
(a) that personality traits influence whether a user
reuses an existing password, (b) that cognitive de-
pletion at time of registration negatively impacts
memorability, and (c) that last time of use of a
reused password and password strength does not
have a significant impact on memorability.
1 Introduction
How well users remember their passwords is a ma-
jor issue of the still prevalent authentication method.
Sasse et al. [31] discussed the difficulty of users to
remember passwords as part of the ‘weakest link,’
an area where usability and effective security go
astray. Smith [33], for instance, has decried strong
passwords as inherently impossible to remember.
Consequently, there have been research efforts that
sought to afford users strong passwords that are
at the same time memorable, for instance, through
meaningful, pronounceable [46] or mnemonic [44]
passwords.
Even if these approaches benefit from strength as
well as memorability, large-scale empirical evalu-
ation showed that the user’s password habits fol-
low different routes [13]. For instance, users were
found to have a limited set of passwords that they
reuse across multiple sites. Clearly, their habit to
reuse passwords would impact memorability. How-
ever, even if we consider that—on average—a user
is said to have 6.5 passwords, each shared across
3.9 different sites, the question remains: How do
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the users’ habits differ depending on their personal-
ity traits and their current cognitive state? How do
the users’ choices impact memorability?
We set out to answer these questions in an empir-
ical experiment:
1. RQ-R How do personality traits and cognitive
depletion impact the likelihood of a user to cre-
ate a completely new password or to reuse an
existing one?
2. RQ-M How do cognitive depletion as well
as the users’ choices on reuse and password
strength influence the likelihood to remember
the password?
We induce cognitive depletion [4] in an experi-
ment with N = 100 participants and observe per-
sonality traits as well as password strategies of the
users. Cognitive depletion is especially interesting
because we believe it to contribute to security fa-
tigue [14, 35] as a short-term factor. We measure the
user’s choice to create a completely new password
as well as the capacity to remember the password
after one week.
Contribution This study is the first one to propose
an experiment investigating the impact personality
traits and cognitive depletion on password reuse and
memorability systematically. It is, thereby, shed-
ding light on what drives the user’s password habits
that been observed macroscopically and what fac-
tors are further impacting the likelihood to remem-
ber down the line.
It shows that password reuse behavior differs
across gender, the Big Five personality traits, and
especially agreeableness. The experiment shows
further that the creation of a completely new pass-
word severely impacts the likelihood to remember
and that cognitive depletion during the registration
makes matters worse. Finally, we see that the im-
pact of password strength measured with zxcvbn is
actually quite limited and less than the impact of ei-
ther new-password creation or cognitive depletion.
Outline After having introduced the background
of this research, Section 3 introduces the method
of this work, including the operationalization of the
aim, procedure, and manipulation and measurement
methods. Section 4 contains the results of the re-
search, especially two logistic regressions: one for
the likelihood of a user to choose a completely new
password and one for the likelihood of a user to re-
member the password one week after registration.
Section 5 discusses the results and interprets emer-
gent themes.
2 Background
This section looks at literature on password
strengths in relation to users’ ability to remember
them. We then introduce cognitive effort and ex-
plain the state of ego depletion. Lastly we review
how personality traits influence decisions.
2.1 Password Memorability
Password memorability has been a key issue in au-
thentication and security for decades [46, 47, 31,
44, 13]. Characteristics of human memory such
as the limited working memory capacity and that
memory decays over time pertain to passwords, as
summarised by [31]. The paradox between pass-
word strength and memorability has been in the
community for some time with the idea that best
practices imply that ”the password must be impos-
sible to remember” [33]. In addition it has been
suggested that recalling strong passwords is an im-
possible task, with the reasoning pointing towards
non-meaningful passwords [29, 32]. This issue has
been used as motivation in the research community
such as by [10].
There are however examples of research inves-
tigating solutions to this paradox in specific ways.
For example, a case has been made for strong pass-
words that are also meaningful, hence aiding re-
call [31]. Other research found that particular pass-
word strategies such as those composed from a
mnemonic are as strong as random passwords and
are less difficult to be remembered [44], that the
character format of passwords matters for recall and
that pronounceable passwords have better recall re-
sults [46]. In addition, that memorability of text
passwords can be aided with question-and-answer
based on user’s perceptions, personal interests and
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personal history (cognitive passwords) [45], a pre-
defined list of cues and responses unique to the user
(associative passwords) [46] and codes with seman-
tic meaning (“pass-sentences”) [34].
However while the memorability of particular
password strategies have been investigated, the field
still lacks research on the combination of strength
and memorability of passwords that are chosen
freely by the user.
2.2 Password Habits
It is believed that when forced to comply to secu-
rity policies such as monthly password reset, a large
number of users are frustrated [19]. Users hence
develop a variety of password strategies. The strate-
gies include writing passwords down, incrementing
the number in the password at each reset [2], stor-
ing passwords in electronic files and reusing or re-
cycling old passwords [19].
Users also have a variety of password habits. Re-
search employing self-report had users claiming to
have at most three passwords and reusing passwords
twice [15]. However, an observational study found
that the average user has 6.5 passwords, each shared
across 3.9 different sites and that each user has 25
accounts requiring passwords and type 8 passwords
per day [13]. The number of sites per password is
thought to increase with age of client, with weak
passwords being shared at more sites. The number
of logins and password strength is dependent on the
nature of the site. Longer passwords are composed
of digits or alphanumeric characters [13]. Das et
al.[9] offer a further comprehensive study of pass-
word reuse, including an empirical estimate of the
rate of guessing at 43%.
2.3 Cognitive Effort and Depletion
Human beings have a limited store of cognitive en-
ergy or capacity [4] with self-control tasks, choice
and decision-making drawing from this inner re-
source. As a muscle that gets tired with exertion,
self-control tasks cause short-term impairments in
subsequent self-control tasks. This is termed a state
of ego depletion or cognitive depletion. There are
levels of depletion beyond which individuals may
be unable to control themselves effectively, regard-
less of what is at stake [5] and in unrelated sphere
of activity [4].
The impact of cognitive effort and depletion
has been studied by Groß, Coopamootoo and Al-
Jabri [17], finding that cognitive depletion has a sta-
tistically significant effect on password strength.
2.4 Personality Traits
Personality refers to ”individual differences in char-
acteristic patterns of thinking, feeling and behav-
ing” 1 of the human. The Big Five [16, 21, 23]
is a general taxonomy spanning across five dimen-
sions that provides a way to model personality. The
five dimensions of personality are openness to expe-
rience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeable-
ness, and neuroticism.
Personality traits are thought to positively or
negatively impact decisions, as exemplified in the
health domain [26] or to have an impact on the
propensity for risky decisions [25]. In security re-
search, specific personality traits have been linked
to different contexts. For instance impulsive indi-
viduals are more likely to fall for phishing mails,
agreeable individuals likely to choose stronger pass-
words and individuals are susceptible to social en-
gineering attacks depending on their personality
traits [39].
2.5 Demographics
Age, gender and education have previously been
observed to impact password choice. Bonneau [6]
found that there is a split-effect in online/offline
guessability between men and women. Further, he
reported a trend towards stronger passwords with
age. Mazurek et al. [27] have found that men
produced slightly stronger passwords than women.
They also found differences by colleges, that is, type
of education.
1http://www.apa.org/topics/personality
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3 Method
3.1 Aim
RQ-R How do personality traits and cognitive
depletion at registration time impact the user’s
choice to create a new password or reuse an existing
password?
• We induce the independent variable (IV) cog-
nitive depletion.
• We observe the covariate variables Big Five
personality traits and demographics.
• We measure the user’s choice on how the pass-
word is chosen in a self-report questionnaire as
dependent variable (DV), especially whether
a new password is created or an existing one
reused.
Figure 1a gives an overview of the relations of the
predictors to the DV.
We remark here that it is essential for the design
to leave it to the user to make a choice to create
or reuse a password freely. If we were to induce
this behavior as an independent variable, we ex-
pose the experiment to the experimenter expectancy
effect [30] which can be amplified by personality
traits [18]. This way the experimenter is not in-
vested either way in the users creating a new pass-
word or reusing an existing one as they see fit.
We asked participants about the strategy they
have employed for the particular password just cre-
ated. Due to its specificity, we expect this to be a
more accurate statement than self-report statements
on password habits, observed to deviate from obser-
vational studies [15, 13].
RQ-M How do cognitive depletion at registration
time, the decision to create or reuse a password,
time of prior use and password strength impact the
likelihood to recall a password?
• We induce the independent variable (IV) cog-
nitive depletion.
• We observe the user’s choice to create a new
password or to reuse an existing one.
• We further observe the last time a reused pass-
word was used.
• We measure as dependent variable (DV),
whether the user is able to login with the cho-
sen password after one week.
Figure 1b gives relates the predictors to the DV.
We take into account the time of prior use in-
stead of the frequency of the password use because
self-report statements on reuse frequency have been
shown to be inaccurate. Furthermore, the frequency
estimates are bound to be impacted by the availabil-
ity bias [38, 41]: Users tend to use the ease of recall
as a heuristic for frequency estimates.
3.2 Participants
The sample consisted of university students, N =
100, of which 50 were women. The mean age was
28.18 years (SD = 5.241) for the 83 participants
who revealed their age. The participants were bal-
anced by gender and assigned randomly to either
the depletion (n= 50) or control (n= 50) condition.
They were mostly non-computer science students,
of mainly international background.
Our demographics questionnaire included a 10-
item security awareness questionnaire, which was
based on the security awareness metrics of SANS
Securing the Human2. Men scored statistically
significantly higher (M = 5.64,SD = 1.99) than
women (4.15,SD = 1.86), t(93) = 3.78, p < .001
with ∆M = 1.49 [0.71,2.28] (d = 0.75). After the
random assignment to experiment and control con-
dition the difference in security awareness between
groups was not statistically significant, t(93) =
−1, p = .3.
Tiredness and cognitive depletion over the course
of a day are affected by the participants’ circadian
rhythm. Hence to control the confounds of the cir-
cadian rhythm, the experiment runs were balanced
in time-of-day for depletion (M = 4.167, SD =
1.403) and control (M = 4.167, SD = 1.642) con-
ditions. We ran a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the
two conditions matched by time of day. We find
that the distribution of participants across the two
groups was not statistically different, with Z = 0.00
and p = 1.00.
2https://securingthehuman.sans.org/resources/
metrics
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Gender
Agreeableness
Extraversion
Neuroticism
Conscientiousness
Openness
Cognitive Depletion
Completely
New Password?
(a) RQ-R: Password Reuse
New Password
Cognitive Depletion
Password Strength
Time Prior Use
Password
Remembered?
(b) RQ-M: Memorability
Figure 1: Predictors and dependent variables of the two research questions.
An empty diamond 3 denotes a positive effect. A filled diamond  denotes a negative effect. Arrows are
roughly scaled to reflect the effect size seen in the experiment and dashed for non-significant predictors.
3.3 Procedure
The experiment was designed to observe the influ-
ence of long-term factors, such as personality traits,
and to compare password reuse and memorability
across groups induced with cognitive depletion or
not.
The experiment group was artificially cognitively
depleted with tasks that required impulse control
while the control group was not depleted, complet-
ing non-depleting tasks with similar length and fla-
vor.
The procedure consisted of (a) pre-task ques-
tionnaires for demographics and personality traits,
(b) a manipulation to induce cognitive depletion,
(c) a manipulation check on the level of depletion,
(d) a password entry for a mock-up GMail registra-
tion, and (e) a debriefing and memorability check
one week after the task with a GMail login mockup.
(f) a debrief questionnaires on password strategies.
Figure 2 depicts the experiment design.
3.3.1 GMail Registration Task
Participants were asked to generate a new password
for a Google Mail (GMail) account, on a mock-up
page which was visually identical to a GMail regis-
tration. The participants were told (a) to create the
account carefully and fill in all the fields; (b) to give
correct and valid information; (c) that the account
is highly important; and (d) that they should ensure
they can remember the password. Participants were
also asked to return to the lab one week after the reg-
istration task. Registered e-mail address and pass-
word were recorded. The strength of the password
was measured.
3.3.2 Inducing Cognitive Depletion
We induce cognitive depletion for the experiment
condition, reproducing manipulation components of
Baumeister et al. [37]. In the experiment condi-
tion, the participants are asked to suppress thoughts,
control impulses to follow a learned routine and to
execute a cognitively effortful Stroop task. In the
control condition, the participants fulfil tasks with a
similar structure, flavor and length, however with-
out the depleting conditions.
We control the strength of the manipulation with
a manipulation check based on a brief mood inven-
tory (Section 3.4.2) evaluated in the Results Sec-
tion 4.1.
1. Thought suppression task In the experiment
condition, the participants are shown photo of a
white bear and asked not to think of the white bear,
a procedure following Wegner et al. [42]. They
are to raise their hand should they have thought of
the white bear and failed to suppress the thought.
In the control condition, the participants are asked
to record whenever they think about a white bear.
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Inventory
Prequestions
Demographics
Manipulation
Thought
Suppression
Impulse
Control
Cognitively
Effortful Task
Check
Brief Mood
Inventory
Task
GMail
Registration
Password
Strength
Depletion
Level
Debriefing
Password
Strategies
Memorability
GMail Login
After 1 Week
Figure 2: Overview of the experiment procedure.
However, they are not depleted because they not in-
structed suppress their thoughts.
2. Impulse control task This task is adapted from
Muraven et al. [28]. Participants are asked to cross
out all letters ’e’ in a complex statistical text for five
minutes. This establishes a learned routine. Then
the participants are given another statistical text. In
the experiment condition, the participants are asked
to follow a new rule, to cross out all letters ‘e’ unless
they are adjacent to a vowel. This rule interferes
with the learned routine and asks the participants to
exercise impulse control on it, which is depleting.
In the control condition, the participants are asked
to follow the same routine, which is non-depleting.
3. Cognitively effortful task We used the Stroop
task [36] as cognitively effortful task. Participants
are asked to voice the printed color of a color word.
The Stroop condition is that the name of a color
(e.g., ‘red’) is printed in a color not denoted by the
name (incongruent color and name). This task is
a cognitively effortful when the Stroop condition
is fulfilled. The experiment condition involved an-
swering 10 Stroop items with the Stroop condition.
The control condition involved answering 10 items
without Stroop condition.
3.4 Measures
Following the structure of the experiment displayed
in Figure 2, we introduce the measures (a) Big Five
Inventory, (b) depletion level, (c) password strength,
(d) password strategies, and (e) memorability.
3.4.1 Big Five Inventory
The personality traits of the users were queried with
a 60-item Berkeley Big Five Inventory (BFI) [16,
21, 23]. The inventory measures the traits (a) Open-
ness to experience, (b) Conscientiousness, (c) Ex-
traversion, (d) Agreeableness, and (e) Neuroticism,
with a 5-point Likert-type items between Disagree
strongly and Agree strongly computing the scores
as means of items for each domain.
3.4.2 Manipulation Check: Depletion
We used a short form of a brief mood inventory
proposed as manipulation check by Baumeister [37]
rated on 5-point Likert-type items between Disagree
strongly and Agree strongly, with Neither agree nor
disagree as central point. Baumeister el al. [37]
found that tiredness and feeling worn out are sig-
nificantly affected by cognitive depletion and can
therefore be used as self-report manipulation check.
3.4.3 Password Strength
We used multiple strength measures and compared
their results. The list consists of
(a) the Dropbox zxcvbn (log10 guesses) [43],
(b) the CMU Password Guessability Service
(PGS) (log10 guesses) [24],
(c) a Web password meter3, with penalties for dic-
tionary words and parts of the username (linear
scale between −100 and 150),
(d) the NIST password entropy estimate [7].
3http://www.passwordmeter.com
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix Password Strength
Pearson correlation coefficient, all p < .001.
zxcvbn PGS Pwd’meter Entropy
zxcvbn —
PGS 0.58 —
Pwd’meter 0.43 0.46 —
Entropy 0.45 0.57 0.50 —
Table 1 outlines the correlations between the dif-
ferent tools, where we observe the highest correla-
tions between zxcvbn and PGS. We settled on zx-
cvbn [43] as reference password strength meter
of choice. First, it has seen adoption in the secu-
rity community. Second, zxcvbn results are repro-
ducible in that particular version of the algorithm
and supporting datasets can be committed to. Third,
zxcvbn protects the participants’ privacy, because
the metrics can be computed offline.
We stress that all analysis results stay valid irre-
spective of the password strength tool used.
3.4.4 Password Strategies
We asked participants about the strategies they have
employed to choose their password.
1. Is this a completely new password?
2. Have you used this password before?
3. When did you use the password before?
4. Have you used a similar password before?
5. What strategy did you implement in creating a
password? [freeform text]
Definition of Reuse If a participant answers the
question 1. Is this a completely new password? with
yes, we call the value given a new password. We
defined reused password as the complement of new
password. Questions 2 and 4 are meant to check
consistency of the user’s statements and to qualify
adaptation of previous password.
Last Time of Use Last time of use was measured
in number of days.
In the experiment design, we opted for last time
of use instead of frequency. Successful recall of
information is influenced, among other things, by
the number of recall repetitions as well as the last
time the information was recalled. A piece of
information recalled more frequently will benefit
from longer memory retention. However, once the
piece of information is not recalled any longer, the
memory retention will diminish over time. Conse-
quently, a password that has been used frequently
in the past, but then fallen to disuse, is likely to be
forgotten.
Frequency estimates, however, are known to be
inaccurate. First, self-reports of users on password
use frequency in self-reports did not agree with
observation studies [15, 13]. Second, frequency
estimates have been shown to be affected by the
availability heuristic: humans tend to rely on their
ease to recall the information to estimate the fre-
quency [38, 41]. While this general tendency was
reconfirmed experimentally, exceptions to that rule
were found when the participants made a special
cognitive effort to make their frequency estimate as
accurate as possible. [1]. Thereby we expect fre-
quency estimates to differ between undepleted and
depleted states.
Furthermore, for passwords that have been reused
with high frequency and are still in use, the prior
time of use is an accurate proxy. For passwords that
have not been reused for a longer time, the prior
time of use is more accurate than the frequency, be-
cause of the diminishing memory retention.
3.4.5 Memorability
The participants were asked to return to the lab
a week after the initial registration on a GMail
mockup. They were then presented with a mockup
GMail login screen. We measured whether the par-
ticipants were able to recall their registered pass-
word (pass) or not (fail). The participants were al-
lowed a maximum of five login attempts.
4 Results
All inferential statistics are computed with two-
tailed tests and at a significance level of α = .05.
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4.1 Manipulation Check
A comparison across groups on tired and worn
out suggested that the manipulation was successful
(Mann-Whitney U, two-tailed, tired: U = 368,Z =
−6.299, significance p < .001; worn out: U = 669,
Z = −4.145, significance p < .001). As expected
following Baumeister et al. [37] in the use of the
brief mood inventory: the moods of feeling tired
and feeling worn out were found to be significantly
higher in the depleted group than in the control
group. The effect size of the manipulation for re-
porting feeling tired is large (r = 0.63) and for feel-
ing being worn out is medium to large (r = 0.42).
The tiredness score is grouped in three homoge-
neous groups, which we call the depletion level:
(a) non-depleted (disagree strongly, disagree
slightly and neither agree nor disagree).
(b) effortful (agree slightly), and
(c) depleted (agree strongly).
Of the control group, 49 participants were rated
non-depleted; 0 participants were rated as effort-
ful; 1 participant was rated as depleted. Of the
experiment group, 23 participants were rated non-
depleted; 17 participants were rated as effortful; 10
participants were rated as depleted.
4.2 Reuse of an Existing Password
We establish to what the choice of a new vs. an
existing password is impacted by personality traits
and cognitive depletion.
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
We offer the descriptive statistics in a contingency
table in Table 2. A two-tailed Fischer’s exact test
did not yield a significant result (p = .215), by
which we accept the null hypothesis that the rela-
tive proportions of the depletion level variable are
independent of the new password variable.
4.2.2 Logistic Regression
A logistic regression was conducted to predict the
likelihood whether the participant would select a
Table 2: Contingency table depletion level vs.
whether a new password was chosen.
New password
Depletion level NO YES Total
Undepleted 44 (61%) 28 (39%) 72
Effortful 14 (82%) 3 (18%) 17
Depleted 6 (54%) 5 (46%) 11
Total 64 (64%) 36 (36%) 100
new password or reuse an old password. The pre-
dictor variables were the participant’s gender, de-
pletion level (3 categories with undepleted as base-
line) and five BFI personality traits.
We selected these predictors based on a number
of prior experiments, which tested the impact of Big
Five personality traits and cognitive effort on pass-
word choice (lab, online, and MTurk). Cognitive
depletion has been shown previously to significantly
impact password strength; it was our first choice of
as predictor here. Gender was added to control for
differences across gender with respect to personal-
ity traits. In previous results, we have seen signifi-
cant impact of agreeableness, extraversion and neu-
roticism on different aspects of the password choice.
We decided to input all BFI factors for complete-
ness.
The null hypothesis HR,0 is: None of the predic-
tors named has a significant impact on the likeli-
hood to create a new password. Conversely, the
alternative hypothesis HR,1 states: At least one of
the predictors impacts the likelihood to create a new
password.
The test of the full model in comparison
to the model with the intercept only was sta-
tistically significant, Maximum Likelihood
Test χ2(8,100) = 25.852, p = .001, Wald Test
χ2(8,100) = 17.816, p = .023. Hence, the model
is deemed able to distinguish participants reusing
old passwords versus participants creating new
passwords. The model explained between 20%
(Hosmer & Lemeshow) and 31% (Nagelkerke) of
the variance.
The model correctly classified 72% of the cases.
It correctly classified participants who reused an old
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password 84.4.% of all cases and participants who
created a new password 50% of all cases.
Table 3 contains an overview of the coefficients
and odds ratios of the logistic regression. At a sig-
nificance level of .05, gender and agreeableness had
statistically significant partial effects. Holding all
other variables constant, women are roughly one
fourth as likely as men to choose a new password.
Holding all other variables constant, agreeable
participants are more likely to choose a new pass-
word. A one-point increase on a 5-point BFI Agree-
ableness scale is associated with the odds of choos-
ing a new password increasing by a multiplicative
factor of 5.
We plot the log odds and likelihoods for the sig-
nificant predictors gender and agreeableness in Fig-
ure 3. Depletion level and other Big Five personal-
ity traits were not statistically significant.
Based on the results of the logistic regression, we
reject the null hypothesis HR,0.
4.3 Memorability
We establish to what extent depletion level and the
choice of a new vs. an existing password impacts
memorability.
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
One of our primary interests for this study is the
memorability compared across induced depletion
levels. Table 4 contains the contingency table of
the memorability. The proportions of this contin-
gency table are not statistically independent, p =
.044 (FET).
4.3.2 Logistic Regression
We computed a logistic regression modelling
whether a participant could remember a password
for a GMail login page one week after the registra-
tion. As predictors, the regression used the the de-
pletion level, whether a new password was created
or an old one reused, the last time of prior use of
that password and the password strength in zxcvbn
log10 number of guesses.
The predictors were chosen based on the ratio-
nale that depletion can impair working memory,
which would in turn impair making memory per-
sistent and that new passwords are less likely to be
recalled due to the missing repetitions. Password
strength and prior time of use were considered in
the community discourse as factors for memorabil-
ity. We considered personality traits and gender a
long shot for memorability after a week’s time and
decided not to include them. Preciously, we tested a
second model with the same predictors plus the con-
dition. We removed the condition however to avoid
variance inflation.
The null hypothesis HM,0 is stated as: None of the
predictors impacts the likelihood to recall the regis-
tered password after one week. Conversely, the al-
ternative hypothesis HM,1 is: At least one of the pre-
dictors influences the likelihood to recall the pass-
word after one week.
A statistically significant logistic regression
equation was found, Likelihood Ratio Test
χ2(1,N = 100) = 51.318, p < .001, Wald Test
χ2(1,N = 100) = 16.334, p = .006. The model
explained between 48% (Hosmer & Lemeshow)
and 61% (Nagelkerke) of the variance.
The logistic regression classified failed recall at-
tempts 56.5% correctly and successful recall at-
tempts 94.8% correctly, yielding an overall accu-
racy of 86%.
Table 5 contains the regression coefficients for
this analysis. The depletion level depleted and hav-
ing chosen a new password had statistically signifi-
cant effects. We reject the null hypothesis HM,0.
Holding all other variables constant, participants
who reuse an existing password are more than 100
times as likely to remember their password com-
pared to participants who choose a new password.
Holding all other variables constant, participants
being depleted at registration time are one twentieth
as likely to remember their password.
We depict the influence of the two significant pre-
dictors in Figure 4, showing the coefficients in com-
parison in Figure 4a and giving the likelihoods in
Figure 4b.
We observe that the neither the time of prior
use nor the password strength measured in zx-
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Table 3: Coefficients of the logistic regression on new vs. old passwords.
Predictor B SE Wald χ2 df Sig. Odds Ratio 95% CI R
LL UL
Gender −1.435 .555 6.686 1 .01** 0.238 0.080 0.707 .19
Depletion undepleted 5.305 2 .07
effortful −1.497 .816 3.362 1 .067 0.224 0.045 1.109
depleted .964 .778 1.536 1 .215 2.622 0.571 12.033
BFI Agreeableness 1.627 .538 9.157 1 .002** 5.089 1.774 14.597 .23
BFI Neuroticism .617 .387 2.542 1 .111 1.853 0.868 3.954
BFI Conscientiousness .470 .512 .843 1 .359 1.6 0.587 4.364
BFI Extraversion .991 .556 3.181 1 .074 2.694 0.907 8.007
BFI Openness −.517 .547 .894 1 .344 .596 0.204 1.742
Constant −11.160 3.515 10.078 1 .002** < .001
Note: R2 = .2 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) .23 (Cox & Snell) .31 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(9) = 25.976, p = .002.
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Figure 3: Log odds and likelihood to create a new password from predictors gender and agreeableness. 3a
shows the coefficients for agreeableness in two panels for gender. 3b displays the likelihood to create a new
password when other predictors are held constant.
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Table 4: Contingency table depletion level vs.
whether the password was remembered.
Remembered
Depletion level NO YES Total
Undepleted 14 (19%) 58 (81%) 72
Effortful 3 (18%) 14 (82%) 17
Depleted 6 (54%) 5 (46%) 11
Total 23 (23%) 77 (77%) 100
cvbn log10 guesses have a significant impact on
memorability. The 95% confidence interval on the
odds ratio of password strength is bracketed around
0.89 [0.737,1.303]. For each increase in order of
magnitude of the #guesses, the likelihood of re-
membering shrink by a factor of 0.89.
Figure 4 displays the log odds and likelihoods for
the two significant predictors.
4.4 Effect Size of Password Strength
We have conducted logistic regressions that use dif-
ferent metrics for password strength (log10 guesses
in zxcvbn and PGS, passwordmeter.com, NIST
entropy). The regressions agreed on the limited im-
pact of password strength on memorability irrespec-
tive of the metric used. How can we gain confidence
in the effect size reported?
The reported logistic regression offers a 95%
confidence interval of [0.737, 1.303] on the odds
ratio: if the experiment were repeated many times,
the confidence interval would contain the true pop-
ulation odds ratio 95% of the cases. Does the result
depend on the metric used?
We compare the outcomes of zxcvbn and PGS in
a meta-analysis and estimate the effect size across
metrics. Both tools measure guessability in log10
guesses and are thereby well comparable. Figure 5
on page 13 shows the forest plot for the analysis.
According to the fixed-effect model, the effect size
0.93 [0.77,1.12] offers a more robust estimate of the
impact of password guessability on memorability.
By this estimate, we expect the memorability after
one week to decrease by a factor of 0.93 for each
increase in one point on a log10 guessability scale.
4.5 Model Properties
4.5.1 Accuracy
Password Reuse There were four cases with large
residuals (4%), with values greater than 2 or less
than −2. All of these case have a Cook’s dis-
tance well less than 1 and, thereby, no undue influ-
ence in the model. There were six cases with more
than twice the average leverage, however, none of
the cases had more than three times the average
leverage. For the assumption of independence, the
Durbin-Watson statistic was 2.4, p = .032, which is
still in the bounds Field recommends [12, p. 921].
In terms of multicollinearity, average Variance In-
flation Factor (VIF) was small: 1.2. All tolerances
were well above .5. Hence, we conclude that there
was no collinearity in the data. Finally, we assess
the residuals. Considering the QQ Normal plot in
Figure 6a on page 13, we observe deviations from
normality below 0. All things considered, we con-
clude the model to be sufficiently accurate.
Memorability There were three cases with large
residuals (3%), with residuals greater than 2 or less
than −2. The Cook’s distance was well below 0.25
alleviating any concerns. Of the 17 cases with more
than double the average leverage, two had more than
three times the average leverage. Durbin-Watson
confirmed the assumption of independence with a
test statistic of 2.14, p = .51. We reject the the hy-
pothesis that there is multicollinearity in the data be-
cause the average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
is sufficiently small: 1.39 and because all toler-
ances are well above 0.2. From the QQ Normal
plot in Figure 6b on page 13, we observe deviations
from normality of the residuals especially around 0.
While the distribution of residues is not fully nor-
mal, we still perceive the model as sufficiently ac-
curate.
4.5.2 Prediction Performance
Whereas our models are focused on causal analy-
sis, we evaluate the prediction performance of the
models as well on the given sample. Figure 7 on
page 13 contains the Receiver Operating Charac-
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Table 5: Coefficients of the logistic regression memorability with log10 password guesses from zxcvbn.
Predictor B SE Wald χ2 df Sig. Odds Ratio 95% CI R
LL UL
Depletion
effortful −1.678 1.265 1.8 1 .18 0.187 0.008 1.808
depleted −3.454 1.423 5.9 1 .015* 0.032 0.001 0.349 .19
New Password −5.044 1.282 15.5 1 < .001*** 0.006 0.001 0.048 .35
Time Prior Use −.001 .002 0.55 1 .46 0.999 0.995 1.002
Zxcvbn log10 Guesses −.019 .141 .018 1 .89 0.981 0.737 1.303
Constant 5.268 1.738 9.2 1 .002** 194
Note: R2 = .476 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) .4 (Cox & Snell) .61 (Nagelkerke). Model χ2(6) = 51.318, p < .001.
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Figure 4: Log odds and likelihood to remember a password from whether a new password was chosen and
depletion level at registration time. 4a shows the coefficients for depletion levels in two panels for reused
and new passwords. 4b shows the likelihood to remember when other predictors are held constant.
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Figure 5: Forest plot of the effect of password
strength in log10 guesses on memorability.
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Figure 6: QQ-Plots for both models.
teristic (ROC) curve of the both models, reuse in
a dashed and memorability in solid line.
Password Reuse For the prediction of whether a
user choses a new password or reuses an existing
one, we see gains in sensitivity up to a true positive
rate (TPR) of 65%, trading off a false positive rate
(PFR) of up to 18%. After that, increases in sensi-
tivity come at a greater cost in false positive rate.
Memorability For the prediction of whether a user
can recall the password, we see sharp gains in sen-
sitivity up to a true positive rate of roughly 85%,
trading off a false positive rate of less than 15%.
After an FPR of 15%, we do not see a significant
increases in TPR for increased FPR.
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Figure 7: ROC curve for the password reuse and
memorability models.
5 Discussion
5.1 Traits impact users’ password
habits
Agreeable users are more likely to create new pass-
words; this matches psychological theory because
agreeableness is highly correlated with (friendly)
compliance in modern facet scales of the Big
Five [8]. Hence, the users’ habit to reuse passwords
reported in earlier studies [13] mediated by users’
personality traits.
Will this effect hold up in the real world? First,
we need to consider the experimenter expectancy
bias [30], that is, the tendency of participants
to comply with the experimenter’s expectations.
Hazelrigg et al. [18] observed that participants with
a tendency to comply are prone to be influenced by
the experimenter. Hence, one would expect agree-
able participants to be more influenced by the exper-
imenter’s expectations. However, in early research
on the experimenter expectancy bias showed the ef-
fect size to be small [3], in general.
Furthermore, we observe that the experimenter’s
instructions did not actually include a requirement
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to create a new password: Participants were only
asked to choose a password. Consequently, the ex-
periment design made sure the experimenter had no
vested interest towards reuse of an existing pass-
word or the creation of a new one.
Hence, we believe that the compliance occurring
in this case to be related to policies internalized
from other contexts. Furthermore, we believe that
a tendency of agreeable users to comply to create
new passwords in this experiment translates to a ten-
dency to comply to authorities and their endorsed
password policies.
5.2 There is a gender gap
Men were four times more likely to create new pass-
words than women. Whereas men are, thereby,
more likely to adhere to the common recommenda-
tion to have new passwords, they are exposed to a
higher risk to forget these passwords.
Was there a bias inherent in our sample? We sam-
pled international, non-computer-science students
eliminating the gender bias prevalent in computer
science. From the security awareness question-
naire, we know that there was still a statistically
significant difference between genders, with men
scoring higher on security awareness than women
(d = 0.75). We believe that this difference explains
part of the different likelihoods to choose either a
new password or reuse an old password.
5.3 A new password diminishes recall
Everything else being equal, a user who creates a
new password only retains a roughly 50-50 chance
to recall the password after a week (cf. Figure 4b
on page 12). Surely, in real life users might do a bit
better due to stronger incentives to remember the
password. However, given the low odds ratio of this
predictor, we are certain that this effect persists is
real life.
Hence, it is actually a rational strategy for users
to reuse existing passwords as this strategy supports
memorability considerably.
5.4 Depletion makes things worse
If a user is cognitively depleted at registration time,
the likelihood to remember the password shrinks
further. Users who are depleted and choose to cre-
ate a new password are almost certain not to recall
it after a week (with a likelihood of remembering of
less than 5%).
Given these results, it is clearly counter-
productive to create a new password at the end of
a long day or after a number of cognitively effortful
tasks. In fact, the user is setting himself up for a
predictable failure to recall the password again.
5.5 Password strength has little impact
While password strength measured in zxcvbn log10
guesses was not a statistically significant predic-
tor, we observe that the 95% confidence interval
bracketed the odds ratio of the password strength at
0.979 [0.741,1.293]. This effect size is very small
to near-negligible.
For large differences in zxcvbn log10 guesses, we
expect the negative influence of password strength
on memorability to be noticeable. For instance, if
we compare an exceptionally weak password with
log10 guesses of 2 with a strong password with log10
guesses of 12, then we expect the strong password
to be less likely to be remembered by a factor of
0.8 [0.05,13], everything else being equal. How-
ever, the negative impact of the password strength is
dwarfed by the effect sizes of choosing a new pass-
word and of being depleted at registration time.
We evaluated logistic regressions with
the password strength metrics CMU PGS,
passwordmeter.com and the NIST entropy
measures as well. All analyses agree to the small
effect size of the password strength as predictor
of memorability. Thereby, we conclude that the
little impact of password strength on recall holds
irrespective of the metric evaluated.
5.6 Recommendations
How is it actionable that agreeable users are more
likely to choose a new password? One possibility
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could be in choice architecture for information se-
curity making use of known factors. While secu-
rity policies today are often written neutrally and a
technical language, one could formulate them with
an awareness of personality traits and their impacts.
While there has been research on how personal-
ity traits impact social engineering, such as in the
Social Engineering Personality Framework put for-
ward by Uebelacker and Quiel [39], we might as
well us a knowledge of personality traits for the
good of users and the organizations they belong to.
Agreeable users, for instance, might respond more
to friendliness in a security policy.
While not statistically significant in this study,
extraversion and neuroticism seemed candidates
with high enough effect sizes to merit further in-
vestigation, which could equally yield suitable soft
interventions. At the same time, we caution against
discrimination of users, especially when it comes to
prejudices with respect to gender.
Choosing a new password unsurprisingly makes
recall less likely. Consequently, arbitrary password
expiry is putting the user in a bind. Further, we
would recommend that not all passwords are cre-
ated equal. Password policies should not demand
from the user to create a new password all the time.
It is important that the effort that goes into creating
a strong password and into remembering for long-
term recall is focused on the passwords that really
matter.
Similarly, given that we see only a very small ef-
fect size on the impact of the password strength on
memorability, we would encourage users to choose
long passwords. If a user already chooses a pass-
word, it is preferable that the user chooses a good
password. “Choose your key passwords like you
mean it!”
That cognitive depletion impacts memorability
deserves a moment of pause. While earlier research
indicated that users create worse passwords under
cognitive depletion, we find here that they are also
more likely to forget them. Cognitive depletion,
thereby, has a double-whammy effect; and register-
ing for an account or creating a new password after a
long day’s work is a losing strategy. We recommend
to create passwords when cognitively replenished.
Let us further consider risk management in fight-
ing security incidents. In such situations, users are
bound the a number of cognitively hard decisions
and, thereby, prone to getting cognitively depleted.
Raising awareness to the resulting risks is impor-
tant. Equally, being aware that decisions, such as
creating passwords, take a hit because of the cogni-
tive depletion, we would recommend to revisit de-
cisions made during the incident response and, for
instance, changing the passwords again when well
rested.
For all these recommendations, we stress that
they are about making dealing with passwords eas-
ier for users. If we are burdening users with such
an unnatural task, we would be well advised to take
it into account how being human plays into the pro-
cess.
5.7 Ethics
The experiment followed the ethical guidelines of
the institution and has received ethical approval.
The participants were informed that personal infor-
mation will be stored in hard and soft copy. The
participants were informed of the rough experiment
effort and the requirement to come back to the lab in
a week, before choosing to participate. The partici-
pants were free to participate or not and to withdraw
from the experiment at any time. They stated their
informed consent in writing.
The participants were paid a compensation of $15
for partial completion and $23 for completing the
entire experiment.
The participants data in hard and soft copy was
stored securely in an office under lock and key, on
stationary machines or laptops with full hard disk
encryption. zxcvbn was computed offline. The par-
ticipants passwords were stripped from username
and other PII before being uploaded to CMU’s Pass-
word Guessability Service (PGS). The data was
deleted from CMU’s servers after 14 days.
5.8 Ecological Validity
The lab environment was comparable to the lab
setting of the ecological validity study of Fahl et
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al. [11]. We developed a mockup of GMail, which
was visually identical to GMail’s account registra-
tion page. This was meant to make the task akin
real-life settings and to keep the need for the partic-
ipants to roleplay at a minimum. Even though the
experimenter did not disclose that the GMail regis-
tration was a mockup, we cannot exclude that par-
ticipants might have noticed that it was not the real
GMail registration page. The experiment included a
memorability check for which the participants were
asked to return to the lab one week after the regis-
tration task. They were to enter the set password
in a GMail login mockup. The participants were
made aware of this requirement in the initial pre-
experiment briefing.
5.9 Limitations
Experiment Design The experiment benefited
from random blocked assignment, but was not de-
signed to be double-blind. Care has been taken,
however, to design the procedure such that the ex-
perimenter would not have a vested interest in the
participant’s choice to either create a new password
or reuse an existing one. Thereby, we sought to stay
clear of the experimenter expectancy bias [30].
Lab Sample First, we have chosen to conduct
this experiment in the lab and not, for instance, on
Mechanical Turk. That has consequences in the
sample being recruited largely from international
students, even if we focused on a non-computer-
science population. Clearly, it impacts external va-
lidity and generalizability that we only cover a small
age bracket and demographics. At the same time,
we note that the Big Five Inventory was first val-
idated on college student samples [22]. Similarly,
Baumeister’s initial research on the limited strength
model [4] was on student samples. Hence, internal
validity is maintained.
The reason for making this a lab experiment lies
in the control of the manipulation. We preferred
participants to be observed by an experimenter di-
rectly during the battery of cognitively depleting
tasks. On the one hand, we found in pretests that
that manipulation checks on cognitive effort tasks
on MTurk showed significantly lower effect sizes
than setups with everything else equal in the lab.
Consequently, we expect that MTurk participants
would not allow themselves to dip into cognitive de-
pletion as much as participants in the lab. On the
other hand, participants who engage in 20-25 min-
utes of cognitively hard activities, allowing them-
selves to wear out, deserve having an experimenter
present who can offer aftercare.
Sample Size The sample size of N = 100 was rel-
atively small for logistic regressions with 4 to 7 pre-
dictors, however, not unreasonably so. We put an
emphasis on parameter estimation of the odds ratios
and their confidence intervals to allow readers to
judge effects observed and their magnitude. Further
investigation with larger sample sizes is needed,
however, to tighten the confidence intervals around
the effect sizes.
Strength of Depletion Manipulation The ma-
nipulation of the experiment group only yielded 11
participants who reported strong depletion and only
17 participants who were attributed with the effort-
ful condition. The root cause for this is that we
used a smaller battery of Stroop tasks compared to
similar setups in psychology. Job et al. [20], for
instance, use 48 Stroop tasks, where we used 10.
As a result, we only have small sample sizes for
the effortful and depleted conditions, which leads
to larger confidence intervals on those effects.
Lying Participants There is a possibility that par-
ticipants chose to lie on whether they have re-used
an existing password, for instance, to mitigate the
risk of a data breach against one of their real e-
mail accounts. Lying is considered cognitively ef-
fortful. Furthermore, there have been approaches
to use cognitive load to amplify the capacity to de-
tect lies [40]. Hence, the induced depletion of the
experiment could impact the user’s capacity to lie
about their password reuse. Then, the depleted con-
dition would see more honest reporting of reuse,
the undepleted condition see more lying. We imag-
ine that lying to a simple nominal question, such as
“Is this a completely new password?,” however, is
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still well feasible in any case. Hence, we believe
that the impact is small enough that there no signif-
icant systematic impact of impaired-capacity-to-lie
across conditions.
6 Conclusion
This is the first study to investigate the impact of
cognitive depletion on password reuse and mem-
orability. While password habits of users have
been investigated in large scale empirical obser-
vations [13], we are the first to investigate how
personality traits and cognitive depletion impact
these habits. Whereas prior work was largely fo-
cused on inducing particular styles of password cre-
ation [46, 47, 44], we let the user freely choose
whether to create a completely new password or
whether to reuse an existing one.
We learn that the choice to create of a completely
new password or to reuse an existing one is heav-
ily impacted by gender and agreeableness (OR= 5).
Hence, it is not appropriate to generalize that “the
user” is having a particular habit; our reasoning
needs to be more refined. We find that men are
four times as likely to create new passwords than
women. This choice, however, comes at the cost
that the likelihood to recall the password after one
week is only about 50-50.
The impact of agreeableness is considerable. For
each one point increase on a five-point scale the
likelihood to choose a new password is five times as
high. We also expect that agreeable users are more
likely to comply with password policies, in general.
The likelihood to recall the password is impaired
by cognitive depletion at registration time. We
know now that it hamstrings the user to create a
password after a long day or after depleting cogni-
tive tasks. As a consequence, we would recommend
to reshape password policies, such that they nudge
users to choose passwords when they are fresh.
Finally, we observe that the impact of password
strength on memorability is quite limited. Prior
research has already found that if users are asked
to choose meaningful [31], pronouncable [46] or
mnemonic [44] passwords, they can benefit from
password strength as well as memorability. We con-
firmed in this empirical study that users are well
able to choose strong passwords, while only suf-
fering from a small reduction in likelihood to re-
member. Consequently, if a user is already choos-
ing a new password, the user might as well choose
a strong one, supported by the strategies proposed.
In conclusion, this research is offering the first
differentiated analysis of password habits and mem-
orability, vis a` vis of personality traits, current de-
pletion and password strength chosen. While pass-
words as an authentication method have—rightly—
earned a lot of criticism, we face the reality that
passwords are still pervasive and often a fallback
mechanism for other authentication methods. It
will, thereby, remain important to understand the
user’s actual situation and behavior in face of them.
References
[1] AARTS, H., AND DIJKSTERHUIS, A. How
often did i do it? experienced ease of retrieval
and frequency estimates of past behavior. Acta
Psychologica 103, 1 (1999), 77–89.
[2] ADAMS, A., AND SASSE, M. A. Users are
not the enemy. Communications of the ACM
42, 12 (1999), 40–46.
[3] BARBER, T. X., AND SILVER, M. J. Fact,
fiction, and the experimenter bias effect. Psy-
chological Bulletin 70, 6p2 (1968), 1.
[4] BAUMEISTER, R., BRATSLAVSKY, E., MU-
RAVEN, E., AND TICE, D. Ego depletion: is
the active self a limited resource? Personality
and social psychology 74 (1998), 1252–1265.
[5] BAUMEISTER, R. F., VOHS, K. D., AND
TICE, D. M. The strength model of self-
control. Current directions in psychological
science 16, 6 (2007), 351–355.
[6] BONNEAU, J. The science of guessing: an-
alyzing an anonymized corpus of 70 million
passwords. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2012
IEEE Symposium on (2012), IEEE, pp. 538–
552.
17
[7] BURR, W. E., DODSON, D. F., AND POLK,
W. T. Electronic authentication guideline.
NIST Special Publication 800-63, NIST, jun
2004.
[8] COSTA, P. T., MCCRAE, R. R., AND DYE,
D. A. Facet scales for agreeableness and con-
scientiousness: A revision of the neo personal-
ity inventory. Personality and individual Dif-
ferences 12, 9 (1991), 887–898.
[9] DAS, A., BONNEAU, J., CAESAR, M.,
BORISOV, N., AND WANG, X. The tan-
gled web of password reuse. In NDSS (2014),
vol. 14, pp. 23–26.
[10] DELL’AMICO, M., MICHIARDI, P., AND
ROUDIER, Y. Password strength: An empir-
ical analysis. In INFOCOM (2010), vol. 10,
pp. 983–991.
[11] FAHL, S., HARBACH, M., ACAR, Y., AND
SMITH, M. On the ecological validity of a
password study. In Proceedings of the Ninth
Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
(2013), ACM, p. 13.
[12] FIELD, A., MILES, J., AND FIELD, Z. Dis-
covering Statistics Using R. SAGE Publica-
tions, 2012.
[13] FLORENCIO, D., AND HERLEY, C. A large-
scale study of web password habits. In Pro-
ceedings of the 16th international conference
on World Wide Web (2007), ACM, pp. 657–
666.
[14] FURNELL, S., AND THOMSON, K.-L.
Recognising and addressing ‘security fatigue’.
Computer Fraud & Security 2009, 11 (2009),
7–11.
[15] GAW, S., AND FELTEN, E. W. Password
management strategies for online accounts.
In Proceedings of the second symposium on
Usable privacy and security (2006), ACM,
pp. 44–55.
[16] GOLDBERG, L. R. An alternative” descrip-
tion of personality”: the big-five factor struc-
ture. Journal of personality and social psy-
chology 59, 6 (1990), 1216.
[17] GROSS, T., COOPAMOOTOO, K., AND AL-
JABRI, A. Effect of cognitive depletion on
password choice. In Learning from Authorita-
tive Security Experiment Results (LASER’16)
(July 2016), S. Peisert, Ed.
[18] HAZELRIGG, P. J., COOPER, H., AND
STRATHMAN, A. J. Personality moderators
of the experimenter expectancy effect: A re-
examination of five hypotheses. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 17, 5 (1991),
569–579.
[19] HOONAKKER, P., BORNOE, N., AND
CARAYON, P. Password authentication from
a human factors perspective. In Proc. Hu-
man Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual
Meeting (2009), vol. 53, SAGE Publications,
pp. 459–463.
[20] JOB, V., DWECK, C. S., AND WALTON,
G. M. Ego depletion is it all in your head?
implicit theories about willpower affect self-
regulation. Psychological science (2010).
[21] JOHN, O. P., DONAHUE, E. M., AND KEN-
TLE, R. L. The big five inventory – versions
4a and 54. Tech. rep., Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California, Berkeley, Institute of Per-
sonality and Social Research, 1991.
[22] JOHN, O. P., NAUMANN, L. P., AND SOTO,
C. J. Paradigm shift to the integrative big
five trait taxonomy. Handbook of personality:
Theory and research 3 (2008), 114–158.
[23] JOHN, O. P., AND SRIVASTAVA, S. The big
five trait taxonomy: History, measurement,
and theoretical perspectives. Handbook of per-
sonality: Theory and research 2, 1999 (1999),
102–138.
[24] KELLEY, P. G., KOMANDURI, S.,
MAZUREK, M. L., SHAY, R., VIDAS,
T., BAUER, L., CHRISTIN, N., CRANOR,
L. F., AND LOPEZ, J. Guess again (and again
18
and again): Measuring password strength by
simulating password-cracking algorithms.
In Security and Privacy (SP), 2012 IEEE
Symposium on (2012), IEEE, pp. 523–537.
[25] LAURIOLA, M., AND LEVIN, I. P. Per-
sonality traits and risky decision-making in a
controlled experimental task: An exploratory
study. Personality and Individual Differences
31, 2 (2001), 215–226.
[26] LAURIOLA, M., RUSSO, P. M., LUCIDI,
F., VIOLANI, C., AND LEVIN, I. P. The
role of personality in positively and negatively
framed risky health decisions. Personality and
individual differences 38, 1 (2005), 45–59.
[27] MAZUREK, M. L., KOMANDURI, S., VIDAS,
T., BAUER, L., CHRISTIN, N., CRANOR,
L. F., KELLEY, P. G., SHAY, R., AND UR, B.
Measuring password guessability for an entire
university. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM
SIGSAC conference on Computer & commu-
nications security (2013), ACM, pp. 173–186.
[28] MURAVEN, M., TICE, D. M., AND
BAUMEISTER, R. F. Self-control as a
limited resource: Regulatory depletion pat-
terns. Journal of personality and social
psychology 74, 3 (1998), 774.
[29] NIELSEN, J. Security and human factors.
Alertbox (November 2000)—http://www. useit.
com/alertbox/20001126. html (2000).
[30] ROSENTHAL, R. Experimenter effects in be-
havioral research.
[31] SASSE, M. A., BROSTOFF, S., AND
WEIRICH, D. Transforming the weakest link:
a human/computer interaction approach to us-
able and effective security. BT technology
journal 19, 3 (2001), 122–131.
[32] SCHNEIER, B. Secret and lies. Robert Ipsen
(2000).
[33] SMITH, R. E. The strong password dilemma.
Computer Security Journal 18, 2 (2002), 31–
38.
[34] SPECTOR, Y., AND GINZBERG, J. Pass-
sentence—a new approach to computer code.
Computers & Security 13, 2 (1994), 145–160.
[35] STANTON, B., THEOFANOS, M. F., PRETTY-
MAN, S. S., AND FURMAN, S. Security fa-
tigue. IT Professional 18, 5 (2016), 26–32.
[36] STROOP, J. R. Studies of interference in se-
rial verbal reactions. Journal of experimental
psychology 18, 6 (1935), 643.
[37] TICE, D. M., BAUMEISTER, R. F.,
SHMUELI, D., AND MURAVEN, M. Restor-
ing the self: Positive affect helps improve
self-regulation following ego depletion. Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology 43, 3
(2007), 379–384.
[38] TVERSKY, A., AND KAHNEMAN, D. Avail-
ability: A heuristic for judging frequency and
probability. Cognitive psychology 5, 2 (1973),
207–232.
[39] UEBELACKER, S., AND QUIEL, S. The so-
cial engineering personality framework. In
Socio-Technical Aspects in Security and Trust
(STAST), 2014 Workshop on (2014), IEEE,
pp. 24–30.
[40] VRIJ, A., FISHER, R., MANN, S., AND
LEAL, S. A cognitive load approach to lie de-
tection. Journal of Investigative Psychology
and Offender Profiling 5, 1-2 (2008), 39–43.
[41] WA¨NKE, M., SCHWARZ, N., AND BLESS,
H. The availability heuristic revisited: Experi-
enced ease of retrieval in mundane frequency
estimates. Acta Psychologica 89, 1 (1995),
83–90.
[42] WEGNER, D. M., SCHNEIDER, D. J.,
CARTER, S. R., AND WHITE, T. L. Para-
doxical effects of thought suppression. Jour-
nal of personality and social psychology 53, 1
(1987), 5.
19
[43] WHEELER, D. L. zxcvbn: Low-budget pass-
word strength estimation. In Proc. USENIX
Security (2016).
[44] YAN, J. J., BLACKWELL, A. F., ANDERSON,
R. J., AND GRANT, A. Password memorabil-
ity and security: Empirical results. IEEE Se-
curity & privacy 2, 5 (2004), 25–31.
[45] ZVIRAN, M., AND HAGA, W. J. Cognitive
passwords: The key to easy access control.
Computers & Security 9, 8 (1990), 723–736.
[46] ZVIRAN, M., AND HAGA, W. J. A compari-
son of password techniques for multilevel au-
thentication mechanisms. The Computer Jour-
nal 36, 3 (1993), 227–237.
[47] ZVIRAN, M., AND HAGA, W. J. Password se-
curity: an empirical study. Journal of Manage-
ment Information Systems 15, 4 (1999), 161–
185.
20
